On 09/2/2014, the Department receives a letter from the Ministry of Transport and Public Works - General Directorate of Land and Maritime Transport - through which the Ministry requests assistance in securing a place to store the goods on board the Rhosus ship, which are Ammonium nitrate materials classified as dangerous, as the ship has been impounded in the port of Beirut since 20/12/2013 (that is, 9 months ago) and is prohibited from leaving due to its seizure by the Lebanese judiciary, and that it is threatened with sinking as a result of its negligence on the part of its owners and that it poses a danger to lives, which contradicts with International Laws.

This book was accompanied by the judicial decision issued by the Urgent Matters Judge on 6/27/2014 (Judge Jad Maalouf) in which he confirms that, and based on the report of the court clerk , that the ship is in danger, which

exposes the safety of maritime navigation in the port to danger, and therefore it is decided to authorize the applicant (i.e. the Ministry of Transport) to float the ship after transporting the goods on board and storing them in A suitable place to be determined by you, to be under its guard. This decision came in implementation of the request of the Cases Authority of the Lebanese State. In its letter, the Ministry requests assistance in securing a place to store the dangerous goods referred to above in one of the warehouses within the Beirut port campus under its guard, so that it can complete the necessary procedures for offering the goods and the ship at public auction.

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Explanation 1

• The text does not mention the amount to be stored

• The written requests The place of storage and not the storage of the goods at the port

When the Department received the Ministry's letter, and given the risks indicated by them and by the judge of urgent matters, the Director General transferred the letter to the Port Operations Department responsible for The courtyards and hangars used by the port to store the goods that pass through it.

Clarification 2

This Directorate (Operations) deals daily with an amount of goods exceeding thirty thousand tons. It receives them and delivers a similar amount to the output from the port, which is equivalent to one million tons of goods per month. And it does so in an independent manner, without reviewing the senior management. The work is limited to the persons assigned to it.

This directorate proposed the use of a section of hangar 12, and this proposal came in accordance with the regulations and principles followed in the port, where the port puts hazardous materials in hangar 12 - Review Clarification 4.

The Director General then asked this Directorate to prepare a letter of reply to the Ministry of Public Works and Transport - Directorate of Maritime and Land Transport - to inform it of this proposal. Add hyperlink 3 Click

Explanation 3

Clarification 3

On to the next:

1. The book confirms the content of the Directorate's letter and the approval of its terms: that is, under its guard.

2. The book suggests the possibility of approval by the Ministry of part of Warehouse No. 12 designated for storing hazardous materials - meaning that the rest of the hangar contains hazardous materials as well.

3. The book confirms that this permission is circumstantial, that is, until the completion of the necessary procedures.

4. The book does not represent a contract for depositing goods in the port.

This book was sent after the Director General signed it to the Directorate of Maritime and Land Transport in the Ministry of Transport, in order to inform them of the possibility of using a section of the hangar. 12 According to the proposal of the Directorate of Operations. He did so in response to the request of the Ministry and the judiciary, and to avoid an environmental, navigational and humanitarian disaster. At the time, the administration did not receive any response from the ministry regarding their acceptance of this proposal. Even the administration did not know at the time that these goods, and before the book reached the Ministry, had been unloaded in Ward 12, after the Customs Administration appointed Ward 12 also to place these goods. It should be mentioned that the Director General was not asked and his approval was not obtained in terms of securing the equipment and trucks that were used to unload the ship and transport the goods to hold 12.

Clarification 4 (Regulations)< /strong>

The work of the port of Beirut is governed by principles and operating rules, some of which date back to the period of the French mandate.

The port follows The application of these rules, regulations, and principles in accordance with the decision of the Council of Ministers and the decree appointing the “Interim Committee for the Management and Investment of the Port of Beirut.” As an example, we mention:

1. Ports System and Ports 4 Hyperlink

2. Nouveau Reglement d'exploitation du Port de Quais et Entrepôts de Bayrouth Hyperlink 5

The approval came The Director General, in response to the request of the Lebanese state, represented by the Ministry of Transport, and in implementation of a judicial decision issued by the Urgent Matters Judge at the request of the lawyer of the Lebanese state, the Cases Authority, and for fear that he might cause, if refused, an environmental, navigational and humanitarian disaster according to what they mentioned in their demands.

Clarification 5 (entry of the ship)

This ship had entered the port on 11/21/2013 (the eve of the Independence Day), and thus obtained the necessary approvals At the time, without the knowledge of the port company management. These approvals are the following:

1. The approval of the United Nations forces to enter the Lebanese territorial waters after declaring their cargo to ensure that it meets the requirements of Resolution 1701 regarding controlling the entry of weapons and ammunition not required by the Lebanese state.

1701 resolution add the hyperlink

2. The approval of the Lebanese Navy also to enter the territorial waters.

3. The approval of the Land Operations Room, known as Oscar Charly, to head towards the port of Beirut and enter it. This room includes representatives of all relevant security agencies.

4. The approval of the Ministry of Transport, represented by the head of the port, to enter the port and be stowed inside it after ensuring that its cargo meets the conditions mentioned in the Ports and Ports Regulation. /strong>

The ship was prevented from leaving due to problems on board. The ship control agency decided to prevent it from leaving before carrying out some repairs. Bunkering Company. And all this was done without the knowledge of the port company management.

What the port administration did not know, and no one did, is that in the year 2015 the Lebanese army requested analyzes of these goods to find out the percentage of nitrogen in them. And when the result appeared that determined that this percentage is 34.7%, which necessitates subjecting these materials to the Weapons and Ammunition Law and considering them explosive materials, no one from the Army Command, the Customs Directorate, or the Ministry of Transport notified the port company management of this, and they did not take the measures imposed in this regard and stipulated about it in the law.

These materials remained in Ward 12, but are now in it illegally and contrary to the public safety standards imposed by this law.

Revision of the Weapons and Ammunition Law - Article 1 - Category 9 Add Hyperlink

None of the stipulated procedures were applied, and therefore, the ammonium nitrate cargo remained stored in Ward 12, without the Director General knowing its seriousness, and without the security services operating in the port requesting anyone to take any action. Exceptional to ensure its protection, or to isolate it from the rest of the goods in the hold, or to hand it over to the Lebanese army in accordance with the Arms and Ammunition Law.

Clarification 7 (The Weapons and Ammunition Law, and what this law stipulates)

Article 1: Military equipment, weapons, ammunition and explosives provided for in this legislative decree are divided into three types:

• The third type: explosives, gunpowder and their accessories.

o The ninth category: items of explosives and their accessories are:

a. Gunpowder of all kinds.

b. Explosives: all kinds of dynamite. Ammonia nitrate contains more than 33.5% of nitrogen.

That is, when the percentage of nitrogen in ammonium nitrate materials exceeds 33.5%, then these materials must be considered as materials for making explosives, and not as chemical fertilizers, for example. Then these articles must be subject to the provisions of this law.

Article 3 of this law states that it is not permissible for any natural or legal person to carry out, on Lebanese territory, industrial or commercial activities of any kind related to equipment, weapons, and ammunition of any category before obtaining the license. A legal license granted by decree upon the proposal of the Ministers of Interior and Defense.

Article 6 stipulates that a license is not granted to carry out industrial or commercial activities related to equipment, weapons, ammunition and explosives except after it has been verified - by the Ministry of National Defense - that these stores meet all technical conditions to maintain the safety of people and buildings. Neighboring.

Article 10 stipulates that it shall withdraw the license immediately from shops that lose one of the conditions stipulated in Article 6. And it also withdraws the license from shops and persons who are proven to have lost one of the conditions stipulated in Articles 13, 14, 15, 16. And Article 15 confirms that this control takes place in warehouses and factories and on every piece of equipment, weapons and ammunition, and their separate pieces, and also deals with the operations related to their disposal or storage.

Article 17 stipulates that the process of importing, exporting and re-exporting ammonia nitrate materials that contain nitrogen at a percentage exceeding 33.5% is subject to prior authorization from the Ministry of National Economy after the approval of the Ministry of National Defense (Army Command) and the approval of the Council of Ministers .

Article 44 stipulates that the state reserves the right to import, possess, transfer and sell all types of gunpowder and explosives, of any kind, and all similar materials for the account and interest of the state - Ministry of Interior - Gunpowder Department.

The facilities prepared for the manufacture, preparation and sale of gunpowder and explosives, as well as the warehouses prepared for these and similar materials, are subject to the supervision of the men of art in the Ministry of National Defense.

Article 45 stipulates that anyone who brings or attempts to bring gunpowder, explosives, or other similar materials into Lebanon shall be prosecuted, in addition to penal penalties, in accordance with the laws related to customs smuggling.

Article 51 stipulates that public warehouses for mine powder and explosives are established and maintained by the Ministry of Interior - Gunpowder Department.

Article 63 stipulates that the manufacture, import and sale of fireworks and any similar material shall be subject to the technical control of the Ministry of Interior - the Gunpowder Department - and this control deals in a special way.

1- Safety conditions that must be met in laboratories where gunpowder, fireworks compounds or similar materials are used, and in warehouses and stores for selling fireworks.

Thus, these materials remained in Ward 12. The management of the port company did not receive any correspondence or books from any party regarding the ammonium nitrate. It became clear later that all the correspondence was between the Directorate of Land and Maritime Transport - the Ministry of Transport - and the one responsible by virtue of its request and by virtue of its appointment as a judicial receiver for the goods, and between the Cases Authority in the Ministry of Justice on the one hand, and between the General Directorate of Customs and the Army Command on the other hand, and between the General Directorate of Customs - In their capacity as those responsible for the sale and damage - and the judiciary from a third party, until the investigations reached the General Directorate of State Security at the beginning of the year 2020, according to what we will detail below.

During these years, no security apparatus, whether the army, public security or customs, held any of the periodic meetings that it holds annually and periodically according to the ISPS system for coordination on port security (review Clarification 8 ) by mentioning any danger in the presence of these materials in the port, and the necessity of applying exceptional measures to ensure the safety of the port, its employees and dealers from this illegal presence, which violates the ISPS system (International Code for the Security of Ships and Ports), despite the knowledge of all security agencies of the extent of their danger.

Clarification 8 (Security Committee)

Pursuant to Resolution No. 5/2008 dated 15/1/2008 issued by the Prime Minister, a sub-committee was established with the task of coordinating between the concerned agencies and departments to implement security tasks in the port of Beirut in order to speed up and improve performance. To fill gaps and avoid duplication in the performance of these tasks. This committee is derived from the main committee formed according to Resolution 89/2006 dated 21/8/2006, which is charged with ensuring the proper monitoring and control of border posts.

A copy of resolution 5/2008 hyperlink is attached

Illustration 9 (ISPS code)

After the 9/11/2001 attack on the World Trade Center in New York City, the countries of the world - through the United Nations Organization - put in place urgent measures to prevent and combat terrorism. At that time, the International Maritime Organization (International Maritime Organization) established a new system to put in place measures and procedures in ports and on ships to prevent acts of terrorism. In this regard, it issued the ISPS code (International Ships and Ports Security Code), which requires taking preventive measures to avoid security incidents affecting ships and ports, and defines the roles and responsibilities of each of the parties at the national and international levels. The port of Beirut complied with this code, and a security plan was drawn up, including Procedure No. 15, which specifies the procedures to be followed in the event of the presence of weapons of mass destruction in the port – every 2,750 tons of ammonium nitrate has a nitrogen content of 34.7% (meaning that 2,750 tons of ammonium nitrate constitute weapons of mass destruction, as demonstrated by the explosion).

ISPS Procedure No. 15 – Add Hyperlink

It turned out that on 28/5/2020, and based on a notification submitted to the Directorate of State Security, the latter decided to open an investigation regarding the presence of 2750 tons of ammonium nitrate materials in Ward 12. The investigation was undertaken by Major Nawaf, who is in charge of the State Security Center in Beirut Port. The major summoned some direct officials at the port of Beirut. After briefing the Attorney General at the Court of Cassation on the results of the investigation on 1/6/2020, the Attorney General indicated that a letter should be sent to the Administration and Investment of the Port of Beirut to secure the guard of Ward 12, to appoint a warehouse keeper, to maintain and close the doors and walls tightly, and to seal the minutes.

So the management did what was required, and with maximum speed. Before the required work was completed, hangar 12 was detonated.

Attachment: State Security Hyperlink Book

Attachment: refer to port devices to implement the required Hyperlink

Clarification 10 (State Security Apparatus Report)

Returning to the State Security Apparatus report, which was not received until after the explosion, I would like to draw your attention to the following points: Attached: State Security Apparatus Hyperlink report

1- Page 3 of the report: "After reviewing one of our sources specialized in chemistry, he assured us that ammonium nitrate, and if it ignites, will cause a huge explosion, the results of which will be similar Destructive to the port of Beirut, and fears that some of these materials will be stolen.”

2 - Despite these clear warnings, and after clarifying the stages that led to the entry of these goods into the hangar, the Public Prosecution Office of Cassation decided to "direct a letter to the management and investment of the port of Beirut." To secure the guard of Ward 12, to appoint a warehouse keeper, to maintain the doors and walls, to lock them tightly, and to seal the minutes.”

That is, after leaving this goods for a period of 6 years in Ward 12, and despite all the correspondence that took place between the ministries and the judiciary, and between the customs and the judiciary, and between the customs and the army, and despite the report of the State Security Agency and its warning of The seriousness of a devastating explosion at the port due to these materials. The Public Prosecution confirmed that the goods in violation of the laws were kept in the port, and asked the only civil agency whose number of employees decreased from 1,000 employees in 2010 to 180 employees in 2020, to tighten security, secure a warehouse keeper, and carry out maintenance work on the gates and walls. , without informing this civil body of the imminent danger. The explosion occurred on August 4, while carrying out the required maintenance work. Despite all the devices rushing to blame the welding process, the cause of the fire remains unknown and the cause of the explosion remains mysterious.

On the eve of the explosion, a meeting of the Supreme Defense Council was held in the Republican Palace, chaired by His Excellency the President and in the presence of the President, a number of ministers, all security officials and some judicial officials.

A second report was read, prepared by the Director General of the State Security Apparatus, and it became clear that he had sent his report to all agencies, including the army and public security, and to political officials in the Presidency of the Republic and the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, and that he had warned them of the existence of these materials and of Dangerous.

It was clear that no one had taken any action to avoid this incident. Even no one contacted the management of the port company to alert it in this regard and to ask it to take any exceptional action. No, and no one contacted her regarding these materials - including the Ministry of Public Works and Transport - or any member of the security committee according to a system. ISPS

During this meeting, the Prime Minister decided to form a ministerial committee to determine responsibilities, despite the fact that the judiciary had launched investigations into the incident.

This committee - chaired by the Prime Minister – During her first meeting to organize a list of names, she chose them and considered them responsible for the explosion by introducing nitrates and storing it in the port in violation of the rules, and responsible for murder and terrorism, without summoning them or interrogating them or even inquiring from them about their work and duties and interrogating them. This list was given to the judiciary, which immediately charged these people by stopping them from work, preventing them from traveling, detaining them, transferring them to the Judicial Council, arresting them, freezing their financial accounts, and accusing them of money laundering and smuggling their money. All of this was done without conducting any investigation, and without applying any of the mandatory principles such as making sure that the crime committed was a result of the job, and without applying constitutional principles such as the principle of innocence and the principle of defense, and all principles of justice, law and human rights.

After I was summoned on 6/8/2020 to the Al-Rihaniya military barracks, where I was interrogated by the military police, contrary to the principles, the law, and the general rules, it was clear during the interrogation that their only concern was to confirm that I I fell short in my duties, without considering the role of the army, the judiciary, the ministry, or others involved and concerned in this case, and without even considering the hypothesis and possibility of an external aggression that led to this explosion. Rather, they asserted that the cause of this explosion was a negligence on the part of the port administration, without knowing or trying to understand the way the port works and the procedures followed and applied in it.

They arrested me after this interrogation, which is considered invalid in the first place because it contradicts all legal texts governing investigation work. A few days later, Judge Ghassan Khoury came to the barracks, where he interrogated me as well, in violation of all laws and principles governing investigation work. Then I inform the military police of extending the detention, which is contrary to the law and principles.

After twelve days of illegal detention, I was taken to Judge Sawan, who asked me about the way the port works and my role in this administration. And he decided to continue the arrest, without confronting me with the suspicions and evidence that necessitate this arrest.

Thus, I have been appointed as a defendant by a ministerial committee whose chairman has become a defendant. I was interrogated by the army's military police, and also by a general attorney (Judge Ghassan Khoury), who was removed by the Court of Cassation due to his previous dealings with this case, his lack of objectivity, and his fear of a conflict of interest in his investigations. I was also charged by a public prosecutor who recused himself from this case because of his close relationship with one of the defendants, and because of his supervision of the investigation in this regard, he decided to file it. I was also arrested by the decision of a judicial investigator who was dismissed due to his violation of the laws and the fact that he was personally affected by the explosion.

Hyperlink is attached to the decision of the Court of Cassation (Sawan)

Attached to Court of Cassation Decision (Bitar) 110/2021 hyperlink

The Attorney General issued the following claim:

"They brought in dangerous explosive materials in violation of the provisions of the law, and placed them successively in one of the Beirut port's wards with other materials, some of them normal and some of them dangerous, without taking any action or action that would prevent them from burning for years, right up to to its explosion knowing the certainty of its seriousness, so they all accepted the risk of the possibility of it exploding and causing harm to people and stones by not taking public safety and security measures or any actual measure on the ground that would prevent the disaster according to the powers given to a number of them by law in view of their job responsibilities, which led to a terrible explosion and the destruction of the department Al-Kabeer is from Beirut, the port of Beirut, and the surrounding residential buildings… without excluding external aggression."

The port of Beirut is, in fact, the port of Lebanon. 80% of all goods entering the local market pass through it. The port of Beirut receives one million tons of imported goods every month, and delivers one million tons of goods to their owners. Thus, the port of Beirut handles two million tons of goods every month, receiving and delivering them to their owners.

The average stay of these imported goods inside the port is 15 days, and this period represents the middle period for conducting legal and customs procedures and laboratory examinations to secure all permits to allow the goods to enter the Lebanese market.

Therefore, more than 15 million tons of goods are present daily in the port and stored in its warehouses and courtyards. Among these goods, hazardous materials constitute an amount of 200,000 tons per year (two hundred thousand tons per year).

That is, since the year 2014, i.e. the date the dangerous nitrates were placed in the port of Beirut, this department has dealt with a total amount of more than one million and two hundred thousand tons of dangerous goods. So the quantity of 2,750 tons of nitrates constitutes 0.2% of the total dangerous goods that the administration dealt with according to its applicable laws and regulations without any problem.

Clarification

The main problem that the administration discovered that it faced with regard to these goods that are prohibited from being brought in by law is leaving them in the port for a period of 6 years without anyone notifying this administration that prohibited and explosive materials had been placed in their warehouses, and without being asked to Taking additional steps imposed by the applicable laws.

So, the port deals daily, as we mentioned earlier, with a quantity of goods of about 40,000 tons per day. He delivers this quantity on the back of 2,000 trucks that enter the port daily empty and leave it loaded. In view of this quantity of goods traded, the main task of the port administration is to speed up the loading and exit processes from the port in order to secure a port passage that secures the Lebanese markets with their daily import requirements. This is what is universally called the Passage Portaire. The main task of the ports and their management is to ensure the speed of this corridor and its effective operation, and to clear its yards and warehouses of stored goods to enable it to receive new goods.

In order to secure this movement and get rid of the goods left there for many reasons, the port procedures stipulate that a list must be sent, periodically and every six months, of the abandoned materials to the Customs Administration in order for the latter to sell them at public auction or destroy them. In the event that it is not possible to sell it.

However, due to the administrative complexities around selling or destroying, which require many approvals from multiple ministries, including the Ministry of Health, Environment, Industry, Agriculture, Defense, and others, the Customs Administration sometimes fails to secure these approvals, and therefore the goods remain left in the harbor indefinitely. Among these abandoned goods, we mention firecrackers and the rest of the goods in Warehouse 12, which the Customs Administration was unable to sell or destroy. The port administration prepared a detailed file with photos, which was presented to the Minister of Works and the Minister of Health to submit it to the Council of Ministers, in order to secure unanimous and exceptional approval for the disposal of all abandoned goods, which have become a threat to health and the environment, with one decision by him. But, unfortunately, even this referral did not work, and the abandoned goods remained in the port, with the knowledge of the Council of Ministers and all relevant ministers.

Today, we are being blamed for our inability to get rid of abandoned goods.

Attachment: Cabinet Referrals

Hyperlink

As for the ammonium nitrate materials, it should be noted that it is impossible to sell or damage them by the customs administration and the port administration, as these goods are imported for transit and it is assumed that they have an owner and they have judicial custody. This goods did not enter the port by the usual methods in accordance with the regulations in force, but rather entered by a judicial decision from the Beirut Execution Department at the request of the Ministry of Justice - the Office of the Cases Authority - at the request of the Ministry of Transport, and for a specific, brief and temporary period, and as dangerous, flammable goods according to their classification in The harbors and seaports system, under the supervision and responsibility of the Ministry of Transport, in order to avoid an environmental, navigational and humanitarian catastrophe, according to what was mentioned in their request and in the decision of the urgent matters judge.

Clarification: crackers and other merchandise

As mentioned previously, the port administration is obligated to deposit flammable and harmful materials in the warehouse designated for this commodity, i.e. warehouse 12.

The explosives in this hangar date back to 2007, and since then they have been abandoned and covered with dust and sediment of wheat and grains entering the silos. It is exposed to permanent humidity, sea air and other natural factors. All these facts lead to the necessity of excluding its ignition by spark welding to the warehouse door from the outside. This was also confirmed by the experiments conducted by the judicial investigator on a model in the port, in an attempt to start a fire through welding work, which failed.

Thus, the port administration has fulfilled all its legally defined obligations. In addition to these commitments, it took exceptional steps to ensure the proper functioning of port work and public safety.

And today she is accused!

After studying all the facts and stages of this case, it seems that there was a plan to enter the Rhosus ship into Lebanon first and to keep it there second, and then this plan turned into an attempt to keep the goods on board in the port of Beirut third. .

Is this plan commercial? Any shipwreck and request compensation from the insurance company? Or was the scheme criminal? What is the disposal of these materials or their detonation?

The answer remains a subject of discussion and an issue that must be revealed by the judicial investigator.

It remains that there are many signs that call for questioning, such as the arrival of this ship on 11/22/2013, that is, on the eve of Independence Day, although no one is prohibited from entering the port on this day, including employees Official administration, 2,760 tons of explosive materials entered the port of Beirut!

After entering the ship, programmed incidents began to prevent it from leaving, starting with its detection by the control apparatus and preventing it from traveling, all the way to its detention. The series of facts indicates someone's desire to keep this ship and its goods in Beirut. The plan was completed by unloading it after the deportation of its crew and the entry of the goods on board to the port of Beirut using exceptional methods and with a judicial veil, as the entry of these goods into Lebanon by normal means is prohibited and impossible.

How can a ship owner leave his ship to sink unless he wants to get rid of it; How can the owner of 2,750 tons of nitrates worth millions of dollars leave it impounded in Lebanon without any attempt to recover it? And how can companies that have debts owed on a ship they have seized stop claiming these debts; These questions are still unanswered, like other questions.

How can officials of security agencies, after knowing that such materials and in such quantity are present in a civilian port in the center of the capital, meters away from a military naval base, not take the initiative to surround and confiscate the goods in accordance with the laws or take any action? Another way to prevent the catastrophe of August 4.

The questions are many and the answers are few, and the arrest of detainees pending investigation is an injustice that does not advance or delay in reaching the truth. Their arrest is an illusion to the victims and society that the judiciary is working and that the state punishes those who neglect it.

But the truth is otherwise. It is the truth of an undiscovered conspiracy against Lebanon, and the truth of an unacceptable and unrecognized security defect that the government of Prime Minister Diab tried to keep away from it and its apparatus by accusing and arresting employees instead of a lost one, in order to protect itself.

The fact that a judiciary applies whatever laws it deems appropriate. A judiciary that wants to delude people that it is a fair and bold judiciary, while the truth is that it is a judiciary that is afraid of its previous involvement and negligence in issuing decisions that are not permitted by law. Or evidence or suspicions about their involvement in the crime, in violation of its local laws and international laws that Lebanon pledged to implement.

The fact that a prime minister presided over a meeting of a ministerial committee determined the names of those accused of this explosion without investigation, and contrary to principles and laws. And this president became an accused and a fugitive from justice after he learned of the presence of these materials in the port and learned of their danger and ignored them despite the warnings about them.

The fact that the Public Prosecution Office is discriminatory has also filed a lawsuit against these people without investigation and contrary to rules and laws by judges who were removed from this case, such as Judge Khoury, at the request of the Bar Association and by a decision of the Court of Cassation - the decision of the Court of Cassation is attached 2021/110 -

Hyperlink to be added

In which she states: "By keeping the investigation prepared by the State Security Apparatus, Judge Khoury appears as if he is embarrassed in carrying out his duties in accordance with the requirements of those tasks in a situation with which he fears the existence of a conflict of interest." This decision also applies to the Public Prosecutor of Cassation himself, who supervised this investigation and therefore bears the same blame that the Court of Cassation placed on Judge Khoury.

The truth of a forensic investigator - like Judge Sawan – Who was also removed by the Court of Cassation because he admitted that he violated the laws and immunities in his investigations and accusations, as he became a threat to the Lebanese legal structure.

This embarrassment and conflict of interest, as well as the serious violations committed by the judges (attached to the decision of the Court of Cassation hyperlink) concerned in this case (review of violations hyperlink), all of which have led this case to the dead end that it is experiencing. The detainees where:

1. And after they implemented a judicial decision, they became accused of implementing this decision.

2. And after responding to the request of the public authority to avoid an environmental, navigational and humanitarian disaster, they became accused of causing a humanitarian, environmental and navigational disaster.

3. And after their implementation of the powers of their civil jobs and their respect for the powers of the security services present in the port, which implement the sovereign powers of the state, they became accused of the most important security defect that Lebanon has experienced in its history.

Finally, after 18 months of investigation, the detainees still do not know why they are being arrested. What we know is that accusing them of these crimes of murder and terrorism is a series of horror and a series of continuous nightmares that began at the moment of the port explosion and their immediate accusation of the explosion and of turning them in a flash into terrorists, not even professional suicide bombers, and by extension, into negligent people who do not care about their lives or the lives of their children.

And all this despite the successes achieved by this administration in general - and those arrested employees in particular - whose performance was pivotal in the development of Beirut Port and its infrastructure.

Engineer Michel Nahoul was responsible for the most important engineering contracts and for following up the works of the most important project undertaken by the port of Beirut, not even Lebanon, during the past decade, and as a result he was promoted to the position of director of project management at the port. Today, he is suspended for work that has nothing to do with him.

Engineer Samer Raad, after obtaining a Ph.D. in marine engineering, supervised the Berth 16 lengthening project in the port of Beirut. As a result, he was promoted a few months ago to the position of director of operations management at the port. Today he is suspended for work that has nothing to do with him.

As for Mr. Mustafa Farshoukh, he supervised the work of the Warehouses and Public Goods Authority for more than twenty years. He also supervised the development of the way goods are handled, the introduction of informatics, the improvement of performance, and the increase in productivity, quantities, and goods traded despite from a decrease in the number of employees. And here he is today arrested for implementing the orders of his boss, the desire of the authority, and a judicial decision.

As for the engineer, Ziyad Al-Aouf, he supervised the implementation and development of the ISO quality system until he was appointed, in addition to his duties, as head of the Security and Safety Department, and today he is also suspended for work that has nothing to do with it. .

Finally, all of the aforementioned and the rest of the employees, under the supervision of Eng. To a regional port through which goods are distributed to all neighboring countries. They also managed to increase his profits from $4 million annually to $140 million annually. And they transferred nearly a billion dollars in profits to the Lebanese state since 2002.

And these are the same people who were chosen by this ministerial committee, from the first moment of the explosion, to blame them for causing this explosion as a result of their supposed and intended neglect of their job duties or because of their desire to carry out a suicide operation. This committee and this judiciary established By accusing them in advance and using all methods of persecution by stopping them from their work, placing them at their disposal, freezing their accounts, and arresting them without allowing them to defend themselves.

Finally, it seems clear that this investigation, which we are witnessing until today, will not be able to accuse those responsible for this explosion, but will try to accuse whoever can.